Missouri Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 1 Winter 2004

Article 9

Winter 2004

Let in a Little Sunshine: Limiting Confidential Settlements in
Missouri
Rhiana Sharp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rhiana Sharp, Let in a Little Sunshine: Limiting Confidential Settlements in Missouri, 69 MO. L. REV. (2004)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Sharp: Sharp: Let in a Little Sunshine:

Comment
Let in a Little Sunshine: Limiting
Confidential Settlements in Missouri
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, priest Robert M. Burns was treated for pedophilia.' After
discussing his history with the director of clergy personnel, he was assigned to
St. Thomas Aquinas Church in Jamaica Plain and reassigned to St. Mary's
Church in Charlestown in 1985.2 Allegations of sexual abuse at both parishes
surfaced in 1991. The victims sued, but in 1993, judges in Suffolk County
sealed all the records related to the lawsuits against Bums." In support of sealing
the documents, the Archdiocese argued that Bums was no longer a threat to
children.' Additionally, the Church removed Bums from all priestly functions. 6
However in 1995 Bums was found guilty of luring two children to an apartment
in New Hampshire and sexually molesting them. After the numerous stories of
sexual abuse by priests broke, one Cardinal sent a letter to his parishoners
stating, "'Ultimately, there is nothing to be gained by secrecy except avoidance
of scandal ....
which too often, has allowed it to continue-we must address it
with humble contrition, righteous anger and public outrage. Telling the truth
cannot be wrong." 8
Stories like this one have generated controversy over sealing court records,
especially when the public has an interest in the information surrounding the
lawsuit.9 The controversy has created a dichotomous split among legal
1. Walter V. Robinson, Scores ofPriestsInvolved in Sex Abuse Cases: Settlements
Kept Scope of Issue out of Public Eye, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Walter V. Robinson & Sacha Pfeiffer, PriestAbuseCasesSealed by Judges, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at Al.
5. Id.
6. Robinson, supra note 1, at Al.

7. Robinson & Pfeiffer, supranote 4, at Al.
8. Lucy Dalglish et al., Comments ofthe Reporters Committeefor Freedom ofthe
Press, National Press Club, The Radio-Television News Directors Association, and
Society ofProfessionalJournalists(Sept. 27,2002), in PUBLIC COMMENTS ON PROPOSED
REVIsIoNS TO UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA LOCAL
CIVIL RULE 5.03, at 39, 43, at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/Notices/COMLR503.pdf

(quoting statement of Roman Catholic Cardinal William Keeler of Baltimore).
9. See generally Martha Neil, ConfidentialSettlements Scrutinized,Recent Events
Bolster ProponentsofLimiting Secret Case Resolutions, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20.
One court philosophized that "[t]o close a court to public scrutiny of the
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At one extreme, Professor Dore asserts that courts have become a

conduit for agreements resembling blackmail."

On the other end of the

spectrum, pro-secrecy advocates argue that confidentiality agreements, protective
orders and sealing documents are the only way to protect litigants from being
required to divulge sensitive, private information. 2 Almost without exception,
members ofthe defense bar and members of conservative organizations form the
coalition in favor of secrecy. 3 The anti-secrecy alliance consists of plaintiff's

proceedings is to shut off the light of the law." State v. Cottman Transmission Sys. Inc.,
542 A.2d 859, 864 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). "Sunshine laws," which to varying
degrees allow access to public documents, are a result of this sentiment. One author
argues about the Firestone cases:
[T]he fact that the current legal regime in most jurisdictions operates to allow
defendants, plaintiffs, and the courts to hide information unearthed in lawsuits
that might save lives does not make it right. Indeed, any legal regime that
facilitates the keeping of secrets as lethal as the secrets Firestone was allowed
to keep may be a legal regime in need of serious repair. Certainly, the public
is likely to feel that way, and we insiders (by insiders I mean lawyers and
judges), must recognize the possibility that the system we have lived with for
years, the system we are comfortable with, may be just as perverse as our
fellow citizens seem to think it is.
Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery
Legal, Illegal, or Something In Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 787 (2002).
10. See generally PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 8. One legal scholar points out:
Of course, the dramatis personae of this debate are not the black and
white warring factions.., nor can the disagreements between them fairly be
described as entirely prosecrecy or antisecrecy platforms. In actuality, the
debate consists of more subtle arguments that reflect broader systemic
tensions in the civil justice system.
Laurie Kratky Dore, The ConfidentialityDebate, TRIAL MAG., Oct. 1, 2000, at 18.
11. Koniak, supranote 9, at 797-800. Another author likened secrecy agreements
to the crime of compounding. He reasoned that compounding agreements, which are
agreements not to inform authorities of a crime that has been committed against yourself
in return for some consideration, are illegal. Letter from John P. Freeman, Professor of
Law, University of South Carolina, to The Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (July 11,
2002), in PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 8, at 132, 133-37. Public policy dictates that

secrecy agreements should likewise be void and illegal. Id. at 137.
12. See generally Paul S. Doherty III, Public Policy Favors the Liberal Use of
Protective Orders in Products Liability Litigation, 4 PRODUCTS LIABILITY L.J. 143

(1993).
13. See generally PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 8. For example, in a statement
in opposition to a federal sunshine in litigation bill, one attorney from Lawyers for Civil
Justice spoke. He discussed the make-up of the organization as "corporations, defense
bar organizations, and corporate defense practitioners." The Sunshine in LitigationAct
of 1993: Hearings on S.1404 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice, 104th Cong. (1994) (statement of Alfred W. Cortese on behalf of Lawyers for
Civil Justice).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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lawyers, members of liberal organizations and the media. 14 Law professors and
other legal scholars are split between the two camps but very few occupy the
middle ground between the two divergent views. 5
This Comment will first address the different ways that parties are able to
keep secret information obtained during discovery and litigation. Next, it will
address how different jurisdictions control public access, focusing specifically
on the current laws and rules in Missouri. Finally, the Comment will suggest
components of an ideal "sunshine in litigation" statute and how the law in
Missouri currently compares to that ideal.
II. KEEPING REcoRDs SECRET
There are several different ways of keeping secret information obtained in
litigation. First, litigants can privately settle claims between themselves without
court involvement.'
Usually this type of agreement is a contract with a
confidentiality clause.' 7 Generally, the contract will provide for remedies if a
party discloses the terms of the settlement. 8 Second, courts can approve
settlements that are agreed upon by parties that contain confidentiality clauses. 9
One benefit of a court-approved settlement is that the parties can enforce the
contract without filing a separate lawsuit;2" however, only cases involving minors

14. Id. The President of the American Trial Lawyers Association, an organization
composed primarily of plaintiffs' attorneys, "attacked the 'morally corrupt use of secrecy'
in the 'dirty little world of confidentiality agreements' that resulted in 'Orwellian
suppression of the truth."' Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality
Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 463-64 (quoting Bill Wagner, Secrecy Betrays
Justice, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1989, at 17, 22).
15. Marcus, supranote 14, at 463-64. Marcus takes the middle ground. Id.

16. Letter from Stephen Gillers, Vice Dean & Professor of Law, New York
University, to The Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Sept. 27, 2002), in PUBLIC
COMMENTS, supra note 8, at 34, 36.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,381-82 (1994). If

a court uses a settlement agreement in its decision to dismiss a case, "a breach of the
agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the

agreement would therefore exist.... Absent such action, however, enforcement of the
settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for
federal jurisdiction." Id.

It has been noted that "for large insurers and corporations dealing with potentially
large products liability cases, secrecy--and ajudge's order enforcing it-literally can be
worth millions." Eric Frazier, Judges Veto SealedDeals: U.S. Bench in S.C. Won't OK
Them, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Al.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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and class actions must be filed with the court.2' The court that originally
approved the settlement can find a party in contempt of its order if the party
discloses information contained in the agreement.22 Third, a court can issue a
protective order.' The protective order can take three forms; it can be a specific
order, a blanket order, or an umbrella order.24 A specific order requires that a
particular piece of information or document remain confidential. 25 A blanket
order gives the holder the power to designate, with a duty of good faith, which
materials are confidential and should receive protection. 26 An umbrella order
designates all discovery as confidential without requiring a duty of good faith."
A party may seek protective orders prior to discovery, during discovery, or after
discovery.2 8 If a party violates a protective order, she will be found in contempt
by the court issuing the order.29 Finally, a court can seal, or impound, all or part
of the records related to a lawsuit.3
When this happens, the restricted
information is usually separated from the nonconfidential information held by the

21. Letter from Amanda Frost, Representative of the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, to The Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (July 11, 2002), in PUBLIC COMMENTS,
supranote 8, at 5, 6.

22. Letter from Stephen Gillers, supra note 16, at 36.
23. Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party
Agreements, 9 J.L. &POL'Y 67, 76-77 (2000). "If the protective order is sought after the

material has been presented to the court, it may take the form of a request to seal the
records." Id. at 77.
24. Steven R. Kramer, Protecting Dissemination of Business Secrets During
Discovery, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1997, at 24, 26.
25. Id.

26. Id. This type of order is judicially favored. One judge characterized blanket
orders as "essential to the function of civil discovery." Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
27. Kramer, supra note 24, at 26. "Through the use of umbrella protective orders,
manufacturers commonly attempt to shift the burden to the plaintiff to show why the
documents should not be protected." Ross T. Turner, Note, Rule 26(c)(7) Protective
Orders: Just What Are You Hiding Under There, Anyway?, 87 KY. L.J. 1299, 1315

(1999).
28. Friedenthal, supra note 23, at 76-77.
29. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 37(b)(2)(D). In Kehm v. Procter& GambleManufacturing

Co., a protective order was issued during pre-trial discovery to protect the defendant's
trade secrets. Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 913, 915 (N.D. Iowa
1983), affd, 724 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1984). After the close of the trial, the plaintiff's
attorney sold "litigation kits" to similarly situated plaintiffs and their attorneys. Id.
Although the court believed the attorney's actions were not willful, the court found the
plaintiff's attorney in violation of the protective order. Id. at 915-16. Consequently, he
was held in contempt of court and ordered to pay damages and the defendant's attorney's
fees. Id. at 917.

30. Letter from Stephen Gillers, supranote 16, at 36-37.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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court clerk.3' The nonconfidential records are often kept in a completely
different room and are open to public access.32
Even with all the controversy surrounding secrecy in litigation, when there
is no rule or legislation prohibiting secrecy both plaintiffs and defendants have
incentives to keep quiet. Plaintiffs often do not want intimate details about their
lives disclosed to the public. 3 Often, they just want their money as soon as
possible so they can move on with their lives.34 Agreeing to keep information
confidential speeds up discovery and sometimes even aids in settling the case."
Defendants, who are often corporations, have other motives. Generally,
they wish to protect confidential business information from dissemination to
competitors.36 Furthermore, bad publicity harms a company's reputation and
ultimately its bottom line; a company will be willing to pay a premium for
silence to keep negative information from the public.37
In addition to the litigants, judges have an incentive to acquiesce to
confidential settlements when both parties agree.3" If the judge signs off on the
settlement, that is one less lawsuit clogging the already overburdened docket.
Without some sort of rule or legislation prohibiting secrecy, confidentiality will
remain the norm.39

31. See S. 686, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002).
32. Id.

33. Friedenthal, supra note 23, at 86.
34. Neil, supranote 9, at 20.
35. Doherty, supra note 12, at 149. One author also claims:
The discussions of confidentiality with plaintiffs' lawyers often follow
a familiar choreography, with plaintiffs agreeing to secrecy first, then later
protesting .... Often, it feels to me as though it comes at a time when
they're trying to put pressure on the defendant to settle: 'Oh, we're going to
give this to the press if you don't talk settlement with us and give us lots of
money and lots of big attorney's fees."'
Bob Van Voris & Matt Fleischer, Critics: Sealed Tire Deals Can Kill but Clients'Needs
Often Require Them, Trail [sic] Lawyers Say, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 2000, at A l (quoting

statement of Loma Schofield, co-chair of the discovery rules task force for the ABA).
36. Michael K. Brown & Lisa M. Baird, Businesses'PrivacyandPropertyRights
Threatened in California,ANDREWS TIRE DEFECT LITIG. REP., Apr. 2001, at 11.
37. Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A13.

38. Letter from Jane Kirtley, Representative of the Silha Center for the Study of
Media Ethics and Law, to The Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. (Sept. 24, 2002), in
PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 8, at 79, 85. "[Iln an understandable desire to
compensate plaintiffs, a judge may be reluctant to undermine an agreement struck
between parties in the name of promoting abstract notions of openness and
accountability." Id.

39. Id. "Although not all settlements are secret, the practice is ingrained in ...
legal culture, lawyers said." John Monk, Secret Court Deals in S.C. Face Scrutiny, THE
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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SECRECY IN MISSOURI

Chapter 610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes gives very little direction to
courts considering sealing documents. The Chapter creates a presumption of
open access to public records;' however, the definition of "public records" is
quite limited in judicial contexts."' The statute specifically excludes any
documents that consist of opinions or recommendations of a decision-making
body. 2 Chapter 109 directly addresses judicial records43 and creates a
presumption of openness." Other statutes proscribe confidentiality in certain
judicial proceedings."5

STATE, July 14, 2002, at A12.
40. Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.022.5 (2000). The statute provides that "[p]ublic
records shall be presumed to be open unless otherwise exempt pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter." Id.
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.010(6) (2000). Public record is defined as:
[A]ny record, whether written or electronically stored, retained by or of any
public governmental body including any report, survey, memorandum, or
other document or study prepared and presented to the public governmental
body by a consultant or other professional service paid for in whole or in part
by public funds; provided, however, that personally identifiable student
records maintained by public educational institutions shall be open for
inspection by the parents, guardian or other custodian of students under the
age of eighteen years and by the parents, guardian or other custodian and the
student if the student is over the age of eighteen years. The term "public
record" shall not include any internal memorandum or letter received or
prepared by or on behalf of a member of a public governmental body
consisting of advice, opinions and recommendations in connection with the
deliberative decision-making process of said body, unless such records are
retained by the public governmental body or presented at a public meeting
42. Id.
43. Id. § 109.180. The statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all state, county and municipal records
kept pursuant to statute or ordinance shall at all reasonable times be open for
a personal inspection by any citizen of Missouri, and those in charge of the
records shall not refuse the privilege to any citizen. Any official who violates
the provisions of this section shall be subject to removal or impeachment and
in addition shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by
confinement in the county jail not exceeding ninety days, or by both the fine
and the confinement.
44. Id.
45. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.846 (2000) (hearings held under the Uniform
Parentage Act); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321 (2000) (juvenile court records); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 453.120 (2000) (records from adoption proceedings); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.140
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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Missouri courts have also made it clear that there is a common law
presumption that court records will remain open absent specific reasons for
closure.' Even with this common law presumption, the Missouri Supreme Court
enacted a court operating rule that expressly gives the public the right to inspect
all Missouri state court records. 7
On January 9, 2002, Senator Steelman introduced Senate Bill Number 686
to the Missouri State Senate." The bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on February 26, 2002, and remained there until the end of the
legislative session."9 A similar bill was not introduced during the 92nd session.
The bill, had it been enacted, would have amended Chapter 610 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes. ° Also, it would have added a Section regarding
access to court records." The bill provided that all records would be open to the
public unless sealed by a court.52 Other than in cases ofjuvenile records, a court
would only be able to seal a record upon a successful motion by a party.53 The
party would have to show that (1) good cause exists to seal the record, 4 (2) the

(2000) (court records received from mental health facilities).
46. Transit Cas. Co. ex rel. Pulitzer Publ'g Co. v. Transit Cas. Co. ex rel.
Intervening Employees, 43 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Mo. 2001). The court reasoned:
It is undisputed ... that there is a common law right of public access to
court and other public records.... [A]buse of discretion is present when trial
court orders inexplicably seal court records, do not articulate specific reasons
for closure, or do not otherwise demonstrate a recognition of the presumptive
right of access.
Id.

47. Mo. Sup. CT. Op. R. 2.02. The Rule "does not apply to records that are
confidential pursuant to statute, court rules or court order; judicial or judicial staff work
product; memoranda or drafts; or appellate judicial case assignments." Id.
48. Summary of S. 686, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002), availableat
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills02/bills02/sb686.htm.
49. Id.

50. S. 686, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002). Chapter 610 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes governs access to public documents.
51. The Section defines records as:
[A]ll documents, instruments and things which constitute or are related to a
civil action, including but not limited to all documents produced in response
to discovery, pleadings, claims, applications, answers, replies, court dockets,
motions, memoranda, forms, notices, rulings, orders,judgments, depositions,
transcripts, interrogatories, requests for production, admissions, exhibits,
consents, settlements, waivers, dismissals and withdrawals; except documents
determined by the court to be work product.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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request is narrow and the least restrictive means of protecting the party from the
disclosure,55 (3) the record to be sealed contains a trade secret or other
confidential business information, 6 (4) public access would harm the reputation
of the party," and (5) the interest in keeping the information confidential
outweighs the public interest in the material.5" Only then could the court order
that the record be sealed.5 9 Additionally, under the bill, if the record were
ordered to be sealed parties in other proceedings could access the information
during discovery if the records were relevant.6'
IV. OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Proposed legislation like Missouri's Senate Bill 686 has been introduced in
several states,6' but few states have passed "sunshine in litigation" laws.62 Some
courts have also taken the initiative by creating court rules regarding sealing
documents and secret settlements when the state legislature has not provided
guidance through legislation.63 The rules and statutes are each quite different in
scope, definiteness and requirements for keeping information secret. 6

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

59. The use of the word "and" indicates that all circumstances must be present
before a record could be sealed.
60. Id.

61. S. 1254, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); H.R. 3239,91st Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ill. 1999); S. 2707, 2002 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2002). There have also
been several federal bills introduced but not passed by Congress. E.g., Sunshine in
Litigation Act of 2003, S. 817, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 957, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1995, S. 374, 104th Cong. (1995); 140 CONG. REC.
7719 (103d Cong. Amend. 1930 to S. 687) (1994); S. 1408, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3803, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-122, 25-18-401 (Michie Supp. 2001); FLA.
ch. 69.081 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402
(2001); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.601, 4.24.611 (Supp. 2000).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; D.S.C. CIV. R. 5.03; GA. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 21.2; TEX. R.
STAT.

CIv. P. 76a.

64. "Many jurisdictions confine their statutes to the sealing of judicial records.
Others speak only to confidential settlements involving a government agency or to
particular public hazards. Still others narrowly address the sharing of information in
specified, related litigation or merely express a hortatory open-records policy." Dore,
supra note 10, at 18.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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A. FederalRule of Civil Procedure26
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows courts to issue protective orders
upon a motion by a party from whom discovery is sought.65 Additionally,
although the Rule specifically deals with protective orders sought during
discovery, many courts have used the Rule's requirements for protective orders
sought at other times in the litigation process." The drafters of the Rule
purposely made the provision vague, anticipating that the courts would interpret
the clause and its applicable exceptions.67 In order for the court to issue a
protective order, the movant has the burden of showing "good cause." ' Courts

65. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5)(c). Rule 26 provides in part:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which
the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the
court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery,
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure
or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except person designated
by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed in a designated way,
and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
66. See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
1999) (requiring good cause criterion in motion to intervene); Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec.
Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1994) (confidentiality by party agreement still
requires showing of good cause); Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2021, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1998) (good cause showing is not just
a formality).
67. Notes of Advisory Committee, FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(c). Some courts have broken down the inquiry into a
three-step analysis:
First, is the matter sought to be protected "a trade secret or other confidential
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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have interpreted "good cause" to mean that the party seeking the protective order
must show that the discovery request seeks information that is a trade secret,6 9
and if disclosed, the information may harm the party.7" Harm is proven by
asking the court to take judicial notice of the damage caused or, preferably, by
an affidavit by a person with specific knowledge of the potential harm caused by
disclosure."

B. South Carolina's Rule
In November 2002, the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina enacted Local Civil Rule 5.03.72 After the Rule was proposed in July
2002, the court accepted feedback about the Rule and allowed suggestions for
amending it." There were numerous comments ranging from those who
encouraged the court to enact the Rule as written or even broaden the coverage

research, development, or commercial information" which should be
protected? Second, would disclosure of such information cause a cognizable
harm sufficient to warrant a protective order? Third, has the party seeking
protection shown "good cause" for invoking the court's protection?
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp 866,889 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
69. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. "This provision does not
specifically refer to the public interest. Rather, it applies primarily to commercially
sensitive information that might cause the defendant some competitive harm." Jack B.
Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials:Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 53, 57 (2000).
However, not all trade secrets are protected. See Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren
Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1981); Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d
343, 346 (Tex. 1987).
70. Snowden ex rel. Victor v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694 (D. Kan.
1991). Damage to reputation and goodwill is thought by most courts as insufficient to
constitute good cause. See Smith v. BIC Corp., 121 F.R.D. 235,242-43 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
aff'd, 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710
F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); Joyv. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982).
The potential that one partymayshare information learned through discoveryis also
thought to be insufficient to constitute good cause by most courts. See Beckman Indus.,
Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470,475-76 (9th Cir. 1992); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153-54 (W.D.
Tex. 1980); Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987). But see Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993).
71. See Kramer, supranote 24, at 25-26. The suggested harm must be specific and
particular. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978).
72. D.S.C. CIrv. R. 5.03.
73. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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of the Rule, to those who thought
the Rule would inhibit settlements and further
74
burden the court's docket.
The Rule, as adopted, created a mandatory process for parties seeking to
seal documents." First, the party seeking to seal documents must file a motion
with an accompanying memorandum that (1) specifically identifies which
documents are to be sealed, (2) explains why sealing the documents is necessary,
(3) explains why there are no less drastic alternatives to sealing and (4) addresses
the factors considered in governing case law. 76 Additionally, the party must
attach a non-confidential index listing the documents to be sealed along with the
actual documents.77 The judge is then required to review the documents in
camera.7 After the motion is filed with the court, the clerk of the court is
required to post a public notice of the motion.79 The most controversial part of
the Rule addresses settlement agreements. The Rule provides that "[n]o
settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed pursuant to the terms
of this Rule."'

C. Florida'sSunshine in Litigation Act
Florida's statute, known as the "Sunshine in Litigation Act,"'" is comprised
of two components. The first part of the statute prohibits courts from entering
an "order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing any
information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting
74. See generally PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 8.
75. D.S.C. Civ. R. 5.03. The Rule expressly does not apply to agreements and
documents not filed with the court. Id.
76. Id. The factors referred to are illustrated in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc. They are: (1)whether the records are being sought for proper purposes, (2) whether
disclosure would enhance the public's understanding of the occurrence, and (3) whether
the information has already been made public. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 597-608 (1978).
77. D.S.C. Cv. R. 5.03.
78. Id.

79. Id. R. 5.03(B). "The Clerk shall provide public notice of the Motion to Seal
in the manner directed by the Court. Absent direction to the contrary, this may be
accomplished by docketing the motion in a manner that discloses its nature as a motion
to seal." Id.
80. Id.R. 5.03(C). This is quite a deviation from normal judicial discretion. Many
critics of secret settlement agreements claim that manyjudges seal records as a matter of
course. See, e.g., Weinstein, supranote 69, at 58. But see Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. AC23014, 2002 WL 1837910, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
12,2002), rev'd, 825 A.2d 153 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003), cert. granted,832 A.2d 71 (Conn.
2003) (court chastises lower court for sealing court records relating to pedophilia by
priests).
81. FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (2002).
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themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard." 2 It is striking
that the statute also makes private contracts and agreements unenforceable if they
conceal public hazards. 3 The statute protects trade secrets that "are not pertinent
'
to public hazards."84
It allows "substantially affected person[s]" standing to
contest any protective order issued by a court in violation of the statute. 5
The second portion of the statute makes agreements and contracts settling
a claim against the government unenforceable. 6 The statute gives standing to
any person to contest "an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates"
the statute. 7
D. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a
The Texas Supreme Court showed its steadfast support for public access to
court records when it adopted Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a."8 The Rule
creates a presumption of openness for court records 9 and specifically sets out

82. Id. ch. 69.081(3). So far, there are not many cases interpreting the statute. In
AcandS, Inc. v. Askew, the court narrowed the application of the statute by claiming the
statute was inapplicable in an asbestos case because the public was aware of the dangers
related to the product. AcandS, Inc. v. Askew, 597 So. 2d 895, 898-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). For other cases interpreting the statute see Ronque v. FordMotor Co., 23
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1992), and E.I. DuPontDe Nemours & Co. v.
Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
83. FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081(4) (2002). The statute states that "[a]ny portion of an
agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard
... is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced." Id.
84. Id. ch. 69.081(5).
85. Id. ch. 69.081(6). Specifically, "Any substantially affected person, including
but not limited to representatives of news media, has standing to contest an order,
judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this section." Id.
86. Id. ch. 69.081(8)(a). The statute reads:
Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of
concealing information relating to the settlement or resolution of any claim
or action against the state, its agencies, or subdivisions or against any
municipality or constitutionally created body or commission is void, contrary
to public policy, and may not be enforced.
Id.
87. Id.
88. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a.
89. The Rule defines court records as:
(a) all documents of anynature filed in connection with any matter before any
civil court, except:
(1) documents filed with a court in camera, solely for the purpose of obtaining
a ruling on the discoverability of such documents;
(2) documents in court files to which access is otherwise restricted by law;
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9
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when a court may seal records upon the motion of a party.9" Upon the motion
by a party seeking to seal court records, the court will hold a public hearing
concerning the potential sealing order.9' All interested parties are able to
intervene in the proceeding.9 2 If the court decides to seal the records, it must
make a written finding explaining the reasoning behind the decision.93
V. COMPONENTS OF AN IDEAL STATUTE OR RULE

In state and federal courts that do not limit secrecy by statute or court rule,
lawyers face an ethical dilemma. Often, it is in the best interest of their clients
to either propose secrecy or succumb to the demand of opposing counsel seeking
secrecy.94 Only when the legislature or court takes away the choice of secrecy
does this dilemma cease to exist. For this reason, this Comment takes the

(3) documents filed in an action originally arising under the Family Code.
(b) settlement agreements not filed of record, excluding all reference to any
monetary consideration, that seek to restrict disclosure of information
concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general
public health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the operation
of government.
(c) discovery, not filed of record, concerning matters that have a probable
adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the administration
of public office, or the operation of government, except discovery in cases
originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade secrets or other intangible
property rights.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2).
Some attorneys believe that the Rule is unconstitutional because of the breadth of
documents covered in the definition of "court records." Lloyd Doggett & Michael J.
Mucchetti, PublicAccess to PublicCourts: DiscouragingSecrecy in the Public Interest,
69 TEX L. REv. 643,653 (1991). Specifically, "unfiled discovery should not be subject
to the same demands of openness and access." Id.
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(1). The party seeking to seal the court must show:
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
(1) this presumption of openness;
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general public
health or safety;
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and
effectively protect the specific interest asserted.
Id.
91. Id. R. 76a(3), (4).
92. Id. R. 76a(4).
93. Id. R. 76a(6).
94. Alan B. Morrison, The Secrecy Scandal, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2002,
at E7. The author claims that "[e]ven the lawyers who had grave misgivings about
suppressing the facts could do nothing. Breaking the secrecy pledge would place at risk
their license and their fee, and jeopardize their client's settlement." Id.
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position that state legislatures, or Congress preferably," should enact a statute
delineating when secrecy in litigation is not appropriate.96
A. GeneralPresumption ofAccess
Historically, there has been a presumption of access to the courts.97 "Courts
are public institutions, paid for by tax dollars for the purpose of producing public
goods such as court precedents, legal rules and factual accounts of contested
'
events." 98
Specifically, when all records related to a suit are sealed, judges in
future cases are unable to use the sealed records as precedent. Courts have held
that once a suit is before a court, the dispute loses its private nature and becomes
the "public's case."" The presumption of openness provides a check on the
integrity of the court system.'0
The court should balance many interests when deciding whether to keep
information learned during litigation secret.'
Judges should consider the
privacy interest of the parties involved in the suit. If the party is seeking
disclosure for improper purposes, such as to embarrass the litigant, the court
should take this into account when making its decision.'0 2

95. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
96. Letter from Jane Kirtley, supranote 38, at 80. But see Richard A. Zitrin, Open
Courts with Sealed Files: Secrecy's Impact on American Justice, What Judges Can and
Should Do About Secrecy in the Courts, Presentation at 2000 Roscoe Pound Institute
Forum for State Court Judges (July 29, 2000), availableat http://www.roscoepound.org/
new/00zitrin.pdf (suggesting a change in the Rules of Professional Conduct would solve
the dilemma).
97. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984).
98. Letter from Amanda Frost, supranote 21, at 5-9.
99. E.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1992).
100. Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571. "[T]he rights of the
public in maintaining open records ... [is a] check.., on the integrity of the system,
insured by that public access." Id.
Justice Holmes wrote long ago:
The chief advantage to the country which we can discern ... is the
security which publicity gives for the proper administration ofjustice.... It
is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not
because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern,
but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice
should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in
which a public duty is performed.
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (Mass. 1884) (citations omitted).
101. See generallyWeinstein, supranote 69, at 58 (discussing different interests
to be weighed).
102. In Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc., the Supreme Court held:
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The judge should consider the interests of similarly situated litigants
seeking information for litigation and future litigants who may bring a similar
suit. Discovery sharing should be encouraged. Making each plaintiff duplicate
the discovery process that has already been endured by another plaintiff is
10 3
inefficient and wastes both the time of the court and the time of the litigants.
The judge should also weigh the interest of regulatory agencies in knowing
the information. Although there are laws that require agencies to report
defective products that may cause serious injuries to consumers,"°4 manufacturers
are not zealous in reporting information that can later be used against them in
court. Judges should not allow manufacturers of dangerous products to bury the
problems under protective orders and sealing orders. Agencies need to be able
to access information in order to protect the public." Finally, judges should

Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and access
has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper
purposes. For example, the common-law right ofinspection [of court records]
has bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records are not "used
to gratify private spite or promote public scandal" through the publication of
"the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case." . . .
Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files to serve as reservoirs of
libelous statements for press consumption, or as sources of business
information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing ....
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (quoting In re
Caswell's Request, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893)) (citations omitted).
103. See Turner, supra note 27, at 1308-09. The author argues:
Less apparent [than lawyers obstructing access to evidence], though perhaps
much more threatening, is the notion that in attempting to force each
individual plaintiff to try her case in a vacuum, a manufacturer's request for
a protective order drags the entire judicial system into the vacuum with her.
In a never-ending parroting of the idea that the protective order will simplify
discovery in this case, the effect on later litigants is brushed aside.
Nonetheless, the court will undoubtedly see the same manufacturer, in similar
cases, making this argument again and again. The "[j]udicious division of
labor between a large number of defense counsel can tax the limits of
plaintiff's counsel[] ...

."

In doing so, it also taxes the limits of an already

overburdened court system.
Id. (quoting Albert H. Parnell, The CoordinatedGroupDefense, FORTHEDEFENSE, Nov.
1980, at 19) (citations omitted).
104. E.g., The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-73 (2000).
105. One author cites the argument of James Rooks, Associate General Counsel
for the American Trial Lawyers Association, writing:
[W]hen crucial information about defective products is hidden in secret
settlements, it's impossible for regulatory agencies to do their jobs. From the
lawsuits over exploding Ford Pinto gas tanks of the 1970s to the Firestone tire
suits of the 1990s, settlements cloaked in secrecy kept regulatory agencies as
well as consumers in the dark for years ....
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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weigh the public's interest in the information. Consumers, as well as regulatory
agencies, should be aware of dangerous products and dangerous people as soon
as practicable.
Many secrecy proponents argue that sunshine statutes will inhibit
settlements and could result in more trials. Practically speaking, even with a
"sunshine in litigation" statute in place, both plaintiffs' attorneys and defense
attorneys will still have incentives to settle claims. A public trial will draw more
attention than even a public settlement would." The costs associated with
litigating a claim and the risk associated with potentially large jury verdicts will
remain. In states like Florida and Texas where statutes and rules are in effect,
there has been no increase in litigation. 7 In fact, legal scholars have pointed to
a decrease in litigation since the "Sunshine in Litigation Act" was enacted in

Florida.' °s
Secrecy proponents also argue that if secrecy was liberally extended,
discovery would be delayed as requests met more resistance."' It is unclear if
that would be the case. Lawyers already insist that discovery requests are met
with resistence and delay."0

Diana Digges, Confidential Settlements Under Fire in 13 States, 2 ANN. ATLA-CLE
2769 (2001).
106. Adam Liptak, JudgesSeek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A13.
107. Digges, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supranote 23, at 76-77. Friedenthal argues:
[E]ven without court interference, discovery might well be limited because
parties will be reluctant to come forward voluntarily with anything that might
be damaging if it were to become public. The value of cooperation with
regard to discovery should not be underestimated. The cost to the parties and
the legal system of continuous fights over what discovery is or is not
appropriate can be high and disheartening.
Id.
110. One lawyer claims "[t]he game is, number one, to stall and, number two, to
try to protect as broad a set of materials as they can." Van Voris & Fleischer, supranote
35. In the public comments to the proposed court Rule in South Carolina, one attorney
wrote of his experience with the tobacco industry when he was suing for Medicaid cost
recovery. He spoke of the defense counsel gloating about using the tobacco industry's
resources to wear down plaintiffs during discovery. In an internal memorandum that was
later disclosed, the opposing counsel wrote, "To paraphrase General Patton, the way we
won these cases was not by spending all of Reynolds' money, but by making that other
son of a bitch spend all his." Letter from Edward J. Westbrook, to The Honorable Joseph
F. Anderson, Jr. (Aug. 30, 2002), in PUBLIC COMMENTS, supranote 8, at 105, 105.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/9

16

Sharp: Sharp: Let in a Little Sunshine:
2004]

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
B. PresumptionAgainst Access to Trade Secrets and
ConfidentialBusiness Information

The court should make every attempt to protect litigants from the disclosure
of confidential business information that does not relate to concealment of a
public harm or hazard. Judges routinely use the factors set forth in the
Restatement of Torts.' to determine if a trade secret exists." 2 If the trade secret
relates to a public harm or hazard it should be disclosed regardless of whether
it would cause a competitors to gain knowledge of a business' trade secrets.
Most likely a disclosure of this type would not cause a competitive disadvantage
for the business because competitors would not want to adopt practices that
could potentially lead to liability. The protection by secrecy of nonhazardous
trade secrets would protect a company from competitors gaining knowledge
about the company's inner workings." 3
C. ConfidentiallyShould be Liberally Extended to PartiesDuring
Pre-Trial Discovery
Confidentiality, enforced through temporary protective orders, should be
liberally extended during discovery. In the justice system today, discovery is

111. Comment b of § 757 of the Restatement of Torts sets forth factors to
determine whether information should be treated as a trade secret:
(1) [TJhe extent to which the information is known outside [the holder's]
business;
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the
holder's business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by [the holder] to guard the secrecy of the
information;
(4) the value of the information to [the holder and his competitors];
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the holder] in developing the
information;
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 crnt. b (1981).
112. Id. The definition provides, in part, that a trade secret is:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.... It differs from other secret
information in a business in that it is not simply information as to single or
ephemeral events in the conduct of the business.
113. It would also protect the court from potential Fifth Amendment suits. Failure
to protect confidential business information may be considered a taking. Gregory
Gelfand, 'Taking' InformationalProperty Through Discovery, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 703,
718-19 (1988).
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largely a "private affair."'"14 Unless there is some sort of dispute, documents are
generally not even filed with the court."' The purpose of discovery is for
litigants to prepare for trial;" 6 much of the information learned through
discovery is not even relevant to the trial." 7 The standard for seeking
information through discovery is much lower than the relevancy that must be
shown in order to introduce evidence during a trial.'"' Once information gained
through discovery has been introduced into evidence, it should only then become

114. See Doherty, supranote 12, at 143.
115. Id. at 154. "[P]re-trial discovery-including document inspections,
depositions and the answering of interrogatories-usually takes place in the lawyer's
office or on the business premises of the producing party. Furthermore, many district
courts have adopted local rules that eliminate the need to file some or all of the
discovered material." Id.
116. Id. "[I]n the daily practice of law, it is the underlying assumption of both the
courts and the litigants that discovery compels the disclosure of information solely to
assist preparation for trial." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Mo. R. CiV. P. 56.01(b)(1). Under the liberal
discovery regime set up by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial
if discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
118. Evidence must be relevant to be admissible at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "'relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
R. 401.
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part of the public record. "9 Courts should protect parties' privacy interests from
potential abuses of the liberal discovery regime. 2 '
D. PresumptionAgainst Access to Settlement Terms and Amounts
Settlement terms and amounts should not be disclosed without good cause.
There are several factors that influence the settlement amount that have little, if
anything, to do with the merits of the case.' Whether the jurisdiction is proplaintiff or pro-defense may affect the settlement. Whether the parties have
assets to litigate may influence the settlement amount. A party may settle a
meritless claim in order to avoid costly litigation. There really is no public
interest, other than of idle curiosity, in the amount and terms of settlement.'
E. Judges Requiredto Make Written Findings When Records Sealed
or Confidentiality Ordered
Ifa judge should decide to issue a protective order or seal records of a suit,
he should then be required to make written findings of law and fact as to why
confidentiality was ordered. If it is not as easy for the judge to issue an order, it
will be less likely that secrecy can be rubber stamped. The judge will be
required to think through the interests to be weighed in each individual case; just
the process of writing down the findings will also require a more thoughtful
analysis of the interests at stake.

119. Even the Supreme Court has held that the public right of access is of
subordinate standing when the information was learned through discovery. In Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart,the court held that facts learned through discovery:
[A]re not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open
to the public at common law, and, in general, they are conducted in private as
a matter of modem practice. Much of the information that surfaces during
pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the
underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not
yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source
of information.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
120. "It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery... has a significant
potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery
also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties." Id. at 34-35.
121. See generallyWeinstein, supranote 69, at 61-62 (describing factors that may
influence settlements).
122. Letter from Howard B. Stravitz, University of South Carolina, to The
Honorable Jean Hoefer Toal (Aug. 21, 2002), in PUBLIC CoMMENTS, supra note 8, at 27,
28-29 (citing Arthur Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,andPublicAccess to the

Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427,484-85 (1991)).
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F. DiscretionofJudges Must be Retained
Most importantly, the discretion of the judge must be retained. Hard and
fast rules may be easier to apply, but they will not fit well with every case. The
judge should maintain the autonomy to balance the relevant interests in each
case. Judges are in the best position to determine whether secrecy is the best
choice since they have the experience and the specific facts relevant to the
controversy.
VI. THE FUTURE IN MiSSOURI
The fact that Missouri still primarily relies on common law'23 when
deciding whether to administer secrecy puts all litigants on shaky ground.
Because the common law boundaries are not well developed, parties will remain
uncertain about whether secrecy is an option. The 2002 Bill proposed in the
legislature"' was a step in the right direction, but until Congress enacts a statute,
the laws will be dramatically different depending on what is the law in the
jurisdiction where the suit is brought.
Congress needs to clear up the murkiness in this area of the law. 2 Until
then, litigants will be motivated to forum shop for the jurisdiction with the laws
that benefit their position the most. 2 ' A federal law will also take the
uncertainty out of which state's law to apply in consolidated cases, which are
increasingly popular. 27 It is clear that the public is ready for a law that will
protect citizens from pedophiles like Robert Bums. State statutes and court rules
are a step in the right direction, but until Congress steps into this political
quagmire, uncertainty will be the only rule.
RHIANA SHARP

123.. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 60.

125. Although a federal statute amending Chapter 111 of Title 28 of the United
States Code will not bind states, most states turn to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for guidance on drafting state rules. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(C) governing protective orders is virtually identical to Missouri Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.01 (b)(6)(c) governing protective orders in Missouri's state courts.
126. Friedenthal, supra note 23, at 98. "Hopefully, both federal and state courts
can be united in support of such principles. Differences in treatment [of dispensing
secrecy] are not sound. Neither the possibility of protection nor a threat of disclosure
should become a motivation for forum shopping." Id.
127. Weinstein, supra note 69, at 61. "Whatever the method chosen, it should be
a national approach whenever cases are consolidated on a national basis. It is not
possible to control the litigation effectivelyif each state's privileges and secrecy laws are
applied." Id.
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